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The Politics of Youth Employment 
and Policy Processes in Ethiopia
Eyob Balcha Gebremariam
Abstract Policy processes are inherently shaped by political contexts. 
One way of identifying the impact of politics on policy processes is by 
examining how policy narratives and framings evolve through time. This 
article examines youth employment-focused policies in Ethiopia between 
2004 and 2015. It argues that policy narratives and framings driving youth 
employment policy are directly derived from the developmental orientation 
of the incumbent Ethiopian regime. The 2005 post-election political crisis 
also played a major role in streamlining youth-focused policy processes.
Keywords: unemployment, Africa, young people, Ethiopian People’s 
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF).
1 Introduction
This article uses youth-focused policies in Ethiopia to demonstrate how 
politics and societal narratives shape policy processes. It does this by 
adopting two interlinked lines of  analysis. The first explores the role of  
political context in shaping policy processes. In doing so, the primary 
focus is on how policy narratives and framings change depending on 
context and political dynamics. The second related line of  analysis 
explores the relationship between broader social narratives and policy 
narratives. Here, the focus is on the two-way interaction between 
socially constructed positions of  youth and youth-focused policies. The 
argument is that categorisations of  youth such as ‘vanguard or vandals’ 
(Abbink and van Kessel 2005) or ‘makers and breakers’ (Honwana and 
De Boeck 2005) of  society shape and are shaped by policy processes.
The analysis focuses on the period 2004–15, when Ethiopia registered 
significant socioeconomic developmental success. According to the 
World Bank, the average economic growth rate between 2004 and 2014 
was 10.9 per cent (World Bank 2016). Furthermore, the poverty trend 
has also been declining significantly from 55 per cent in 2000 to 31 per 
cent in 2013 (UNDP 2014; World Bank 2016). At the same time, the 
country’s political landscape also changed considerably. With three 
national elections conducted during this period, the ruling party, the 
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Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), emerged 
as the dominant political actor in the country. One example of  this 
dominance is the current parliament (2015–20) where the party controls 
100 per cent of  the seats. The article explores how these political and 
economic dynamics have been affecting youth-focused policy processes.
There are two questions that motivate the analysis. First, how does 
politics shape policies relating to youth employment? In answering this 
question, I will demonstrate that policy processes are not technocratic, 
linear and rational, but are rather driven by political dynamics and 
interests. Second, how do socially constructed positions of  youth affect 
policies that address youth employment? Answering this question 
contributes to the understanding of  how societal beliefs can be 
translated into policy frameworks and how politically crafted policies 
interact with social narratives. To address these questions, a legal 
document, two youth-specific policies and the youth-focused sections of  
three consecutive national development plans are examined.
Two core arguments are developed. First, dominant policy narratives 
and framings relating to youth are directly derived from the political 
orientations of  the government, which in Ethiopia is building a 
developmental state through rapid economic growth. In line with 
the developmental orientation, policy narratives and framings have 
changed from portraying youth as ‘vagrants’ and ‘threats’ to society, 
or ‘marginalised and victims of  social evils’, to seeing them as 
‘entrepreneurs’ and ‘seeds of  democracy and development’. Second, 
with specific focus on youth employment, the policy process was driven 
by the need to respond to a political crisis.
The remainder of  the article is divided into four sections. Section 2 
introduces the two main ways of  understanding the social position of  
youth, viz. as an age group or a transitional stage. Section 3 sets the 
context towards understanding the social position of  Ethiopian youth. 
Hence, the section provides an overview of  the political and policy 
context and implications for the social position of  youth. Section 4 
analyses the four policy documents in order to address two central 
questions. Finally, Section 5 discusses the findings and concludes.
2 The social position of youth
2.1 Age-based notions of youth
Age is one of  the most crucial elements that shapes understandings of  
youth. One of  the central features of  age-based categorisation of  youth 
is the assumption that there are ‘clearly identifiable processes which 
are universal’ (Wyn and White 1997: 53). Hence, when young people 
depart from the assumed set processes and behaviours, they are easily 
categorised as ‘deviants’ and ‘abnormal’ (ibid.). Age-based categorisations 
are often used to frame policy interventions in areas such as education, 
health and criminal justice. One important limitation of  age-based 
understandings of  youth is that they promote a categorical approach. 
Examples include the notions of  ‘adolescents’ and ‘juveniles’ that link 
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the biological age of  young people to their psychological and emotional 
status, and to their social identity and behaviour. This is critiqued for 
being ‘biologically determinist’ and reducing the experiences of  young 
people at the individual level (Wyn and White 1997: 54–7).
However, one cannot ignore the crucial role that age plays in shaping 
the experiences, opportunities and challenges of  youth. One way of  
broadening the understanding of  youth is to examine how biological 
age shapes interactions between youth and the state as well as with 
other social institutions. For example, some argue that states use ‘age 
statuses’ to categorise youth as a ‘discrete and distinctive social category’ 
(Mizen 2002: 6), and that this categorisation provides a foundation for 
dominant policy narratives that subsequently shape the experiences 
of  young people (Wyn and White 1997). Age also interacts with state 
institutions through, for example, the legal voting age, age-based 
eligibility to claim social and economic rights (such as minimum/living 
wage) and access criteria for state loans.
Age-based characterisation of  youth plays a central role in policy 
narratives built around the notions of  ‘demographic dividend’ and 
‘youth bulge’. ‘Reaping the demographic dividend’ essentially requires 
policy and institutional frameworks to make the segment of  society 
within a certain age range healthier, educated and more productive 
(Bloom and Williamson 1998). Without age-specific characterisation, 
one can argue that all aspects of  policy relating to youth will remain 
weak (Mizen 2002: 8). However, the experience of  being ‘a youth’ is not 
only about belonging to a certain age group for a specified period – it is 
also about growing up and transitioning to the status of  adulthood.
2.2 Transitional status of youth
Youth is not a permanent status, and some scholars argue that the 
meaning of  youth is inextricably linked with the concept of  adulthood 
(Wyn and White 1997: 11). Signs and processes associated with the 
transition to adulthood include school-to-work transition, economic 
independence, leaving the parental home and establishing a family. 
Processes of  transition are complex, non-linear and context-dependent, 
which only complicates the job of  much youth policy that aims to 
facilitate transitions into adulthood.
It is important to note that growing up is a social process that is 
contingent on the interplay of  enabling and constraining conditions 
within a given context and society. State policies and institutions in 
particular have a direct impact on youth transitions. For example, the 
introduction of  neoliberal policies impacted on the lives of  many African 
young people (Caffentzis 2002). Withdrawal of  state guarantees to rights 
and services in the areas of  health, education and employment severely 
affected young peoples’ transitions into adulthood. In some cases, the 
failure and degeneration of  the state led to civil war and protracted 
conflict, with young people being both victims and perpetrators (Abbink 
and van Kessel 2005; Honwana and De Boeck 2005). More generally, 
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in contexts where the state fails to deliver the benefits of  development, 
smooth transitions to adulthood are compromised.
Precarious socioeconomic conditions, civil unrest and institutional 
exclusion can also prolong the process of  transition. Honwana developed 
the concept of  waithood to explain this, with waithood being ‘a prolonged 
period of  suspension between childhood and adulthood’ (2012: 1). 
The argument is that because of  structural challenges which hinder 
social mobility there are multiple cases where youthhood has become a 
more permanent status rather than a transitional stage. Furthermore, 
in situations where transitions are prolonged, young people often 
engage in survival strategies while navigating the contours of  waithood. 
Expressions such as ‘eke out a living’ or ‘getting by’ (Honwana 2012) 
and ‘hustling’ (Di Nunzio 2012) provide a flavour of  this navigation. 
The key point is that this period of  ‘extended liminality’ increases the 
vulnerability of  young people (Honwana 2012).
In the following section, the article reflects on age-based experiences 
and transitional statuses of  youth in recent Ethiopian socioeconomic 
and political contexts.
3 Ethiopian youth: political contexts, policies and changing social 
positions
This section sets the ground to understand the interplay between 
political contexts, policies and changing social positions of  youth. It first 
discusses the notions of  political context and politics. Then, after a brief  
historical overview, the methods of  analysis used are presented.
In a nutshell, an appreciation of  political context helps to understand 
when policy processes emerge onto the scene, how policy is crafted and 
who the leading or powerful actors are, both in policy formulation and 
implementation (Turner, Hulme and McCourt 2015). This approach 
contrasts with the ‘stages’ approach to the policy process, which focuses 
on technical processes (Jenkins 1978). Whilst examining the role of  
political context in policy processes, it is imperative to clearly set how 
the study approaches politics.
For the purposes of  this study, politics is understood as ‘the processes 
of  conflict, cooperation and negotiation involved in the [ownership], 
use, production and distribution of  resources’ (Leftwich 1996: 17). 
In operational terms, this definition leads to a concern with how 
youth-focused policy processes trigger ‘conflict, cooperation and 
negotiation’ (ibid.) between the Ethiopian state and youth. Because of  
the interest in youth employment policy, economic opportunity and 
fulfilment of  economic citizenship rights are crucial elements around 
which the processes of  conflict, cooperation and negotiation occur. 
Political processes that affect the provision of  economic opportunities 
directly influence how economic resources are accessed and claimed 
by youth. Furthermore, changing social positions of  youth are also 
inextricably linked with the evolving political context, and affect the 
dynamics of  conflict, cooperation and negotiation between state and 
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youth. Likewise, societal narratives about youth cannot remain insulated 
from the dominant features of  politics.
Here it is important to sketch out how the changing political context in 
Ethiopia has affected the social positions of  youth. After the EPRDF 
came to power in 1991, the country was forced to implement structural 
adjustment programmes by the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) (Demissie 2008; Feyissa 2011). Despite strong 
ideological resistance from the EPRDF not to reduce the state to an 
ideal ‘night-watchman’ status as the neoliberal policies would have 
required, there was a considerable escalation of  privatisation (Stiglitz 
2002). The EPRDF tried its best to remain committed to its ideological 
aspiration of  building a socialist economy. To this end, the party pursued 
its revolutionary democracy ideology to remain the politically dominant 
player in the country while strategically engaging with western donors 
(Feyissa 2011). The strength of  the EPRDF’s ideological commitment 
was demonstrated by its determination not to relinquish state ownership 
of  land and not to liberalise key sectors of  the economy such as finance, 
telecoms, transport and energy. Nevertheless, other aspects of  the 
stabilisation and privatisation programme were implemented.
The structural adjustment programmes had significant impact on 
society in general and youth in particular. Especially in urban areas, 
government employment, which was often considered ‘desirable’ (Mains 
2011: 115) for young people joining the labour market, was severely 
affected. A reduced public sector as a result of  privatisation, reduction 
of  public expenditure and restructuration contributed to increased 
unemployment (Krishnan, Selassie and Dercon 1998; Demissie 2008). 
On top of  limited employment opportunities, the number of  high 
school graduates continued to increase. With a growing gap between 
the available employment opportunities and the number of  new young 
jobseekers, the seemingly predetermined process of  transition into 
adulthood started to derail, resulting in new societal problems.
Youth unemployment became a major problem starting from the early 
years of  EPRDF’s tenure. A socioeconomic household sample survey 
conducted in 1994 revealed that young people below the age of  35 
constituted 90 per cent of  the urban unemployed (68 per cent between 
the ages of  16–25) (cited in Kebbede 2004). Another study argued that 
in 1994, 50 per cent of  the male workforce below the age of  30 were 
unemployed in urban areas (Serneels 2004). The considerably reduced 
capacity of  the state to offer employment opportunities was seen to 
explain urban youth unemployment. Furthermore, the mismatch between 
education and job openings was also a major factor. For example, 
another survey in 1994 showed that in Addis Ababa, 50 per cent of  the 
unemployed youth were high school graduates (cited in Minas 2002).
In 2001, a decade after it came to power, the EPRDF went through 
a major ideological revision. The objective of  creating a socialist 
society was dropped in favour of  building a capitalist society 
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(Tadesse and Young 2003). As a result, the principles of  free market 
economics were adopted, and there were more opportunities for 
private accumulation of  wealth. The late prime minister called this new 
development strategy ‘democratic developmentalism’ (Zenawi 2006). 
The reform processes also endorsed the good governance agenda and 
established formal institutional and policy frameworks. As part of  
this, the first youth-focused ministry was established in 2000, and was 
mandated to formulate the first national youth policy.
The first post-reform election was in May 2005, and in a relatively 
open political environment, the ruling party suffered huge losses (Aalen 
and Tronvoll 2009). However, the EPRDF used its power over the 
military to squash both opposition parties and protest activities during 
the post-election period (Aalen and Tronvoll 2009; Gudina 2011). 
Following the wake of  the post-election violence, EPRDF undertook 
a campaign of  mass mobilisation, particularly targeting urban youth 
who participated in protest activities in significant numbers (Di Nunzio 
2012). To this end, the EPRDF-led government started to invest 
heavily to address urban youth employment, and to reduce youth 
marginalisation through the introduction of  youth participation fora.
Furthermore, the EPRDF controlled the post-2005 political context by 
putting in place institutions and politico-legal frameworks to guide the 
processes of  conflict, cooperation and negotiation. These, combined 
with political repression, acted to constrain the activities of  opposition 
parties, private media and civil society organisations (Aalen and Tronvoll 
2009; Gudina 2011). At the same time, the ruling party enhanced its 
political power by establishing channels of  mass mobilisation targeting 
women, youth, farmers and other segments of  society. These served 
both as spheres of  cooperation and negotiation as well as political 
control. In contrast to the early 1990s period of  dismantling public 
services, the EPRDF expanded the state structure which also created 
massive employment opportunities. Mobilisation occurred hand in hand 
with recruitment into the party structure, which also involved resource 
distribution. Young people became crucial targets of  the ruling party 
in these processes of  cooperation and negotiation, which included 
controlled economic and political inclusion. For example, the ruling 
party established its youth league in May 2009 with 180,000 founding 
members, and reaching 2.3 million in 2013 (EPRDF 2013). At the 
same time, party membership also increased exponentially from around 
700,000 in 2005 to 6.3 million in 2013. These efforts to manage conflict 
and promote cooperation and negotiation have been important aspects 
of  the ruling party’s agenda of  ‘democratic developmentalism’.
The remainder of  the article uses discourse analysis to examine 
youth-focused policy documents. Narratives and framings are analysed 
with considerable focus given to the policy processes and context. Since 
the study relies on secondary data, it also refers to studies conducted 
on Ethiopian youth to provide additional evidence alongside the close 
examination of  the policy documents.
(Endnotes)
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4 Analysis of youth employment-focused policies
This section presents analysis of  policy frameworks that address youth 
employment launched by the Ethiopian state between 2004 and 
2015. The analysis is based on a review of  one legal document, two 
youth-focused policy documents and three national development plans.
4.1 Vagrancy Control Proclamation
The Vagrancy Control Proclamation (VCP) (384/2004) came into force on 
27 January 2004. The preface of  the proclamation explains the rationale: 
‘Vagrancy is increasing and wide-spreading in our country from time to 
time, thereby creating a threat to the tranquillity and order of  the people’ 
(FDRE 2004: 2533). Hence, the purpose is ‘to permanently dispel this 
threat… to bring criminals to justice and create conditions for their social 
rehabilitation’ (ibid.). The objective of  the VCP is ‘… bringing criminals 
to justice, imposing punishment proportionate to their crimes and to 
create conditions for their transformation into law-abiding and productive 
citizenry’ (FDRE 2004: 2534). The VCP defines vagrancy as ‘… whosoever, 
being able-bodied, having no visible means of  subsistence’ but found 
committing actions restricted in the proclamation. Such restricted actions 
include ‘betting and gambling in a public place, substance abuse, disturbing 
on streets or around schools, participating in organized gang brawls’ (FDRE 
2004: 2534–6). ‘Police’ and the ‘federal prisons commission’ are identified 
as being responsible for implementing the VCP. The proclamation also sets 
up a ‘centre’ for psychosocial and behavioural counselling as an institutional 
mechanism for providing ‘rehabilitation services to any persons convicted 
of  vagrancy’ (FDRE 2004: 2534).
In terms of  political context, it is worth considering two important 
factors that contributed to the emergence of  the VCP. First, as argued 
earlier, the contraction of  the public sector due to structural adjustment 
programmes significantly reduced potential job opportunities. The 
nascent private sector was not at the time mature enough to create 
employment opportunities for the increasing young population. As 
a result, young people, many of  whom were high school graduates, 
remained unemployed for relatively long periods of  time. But remaining 
unemployed defies societal expectations about youth. Since youth is 
considered as a short period of  transition, moving out of  this temporary 
status is essential, and not being able to complete this transition is 
deviancy. For example, Mains (2012) described how members of  the 
wider society in Jimma town, south-western Ethiopia, felt insecure and 
threatened with the presence of  ‘idle’ and ‘unemployed’ young men on 
the streets. For the young men, the ‘abundance of  unstructured time’ 
(ibid: 122) was a trap that they wanted to escape from if  they could get 
job opportunities. With quite narrow job opportunities, as well as with 
limited skills acquired through education, the young men were forced to 
pass most of  their time ‘hanging out on street corners, watching films, 
chewing khat (mild stimulant)’ (ibid: 123).
Second, the VCP was introduced in the wake of  large-scale unrest in the 
capital following Addis Ababa University student protests in April 2001. 
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The students called for the reinstatement of  the independent students’ 
union and newspaper, and replacement of  armed campus police 
with civilian police (Balsvik 2007). The protest spilled over into the 
city and resulted in large-scale looting, ransacking and vandalism in 
major market and shopping areas. At least 40 people were killed. The 
government accused unemployed young people and opposition parties 
of  being the main perpetrators of  the violence and looting (ibid.): the 
blame was laid at the feet of  ‘unruly’ and ‘unemployed’ youth.
The name of  the Amharic version of  the VCP can be literally 
translated into ‘Dangerous Vagrancy Control Proclamation’. The 
use of  such alarmist language helps to garner unconditional moral 
and normative support. The VCP argues that social ‘order’ and 
‘tranquillity’ is compromised because of  ‘dangerous vagrancy’. Hence, 
‘punishment’ and ‘rehabilitation’ need to be administered as remedies. 
With such interventions, the VCP claims it will restore societal order 
by ‘transforming’ criminals into ‘law-abiding and productive citizenry’. 
Furthermore, the VCP strengthens the crisis narrative and the need 
for urgent action by adding both a space and time dimension. The 
proclamation depicts ‘dangerous vagrancy’ as ‘wide-spreading’, which 
implies it affects or will affect large areas and numbers of  people, 
while the phrase ‘from time to time’ is ambiguous and provides no real 
indication of  the prevalence of  the problem (FDRE 2004: 2533–4).
Both the narratives and framings in the VCP correspond with societal 
narratives about ‘idle’ and ‘unemployed’ youth who pass most of  their 
time on the street. These youth were perceived as deviants because 
of  their failure to meet societal expectations of  growing up and 
becoming independent adults. The VCP builds on such narratives, 
and making reference to occasional, large-scale incidents such as the 
riot in April 2001 links unemployment with crime. Furthermore, 
the VCP also claims moral superiority by stating its purpose as ‘to 
bring criminals to justice’. In addition to the judiciary solution, the 
VCP declared its intention to change the values of  vagrants through 
‘social rehabilitation’, which was broadly defined as ‘transformation 
into law-abiding and productive citizenry’. The components of  social 
rehabilitation mentioned in the proclamation include education, 
vocational training, civic education, counselling and hard labour. 
The police, public prosecutor, courts and ‘rehabilitation centre’ were 
identified as key implementers of  the VCP (FDRE 2004: 2538–9).
The VCP’s link with youth employment can be seen in its targeting of  
unemployed youth. One of  the key elements of  the definition of  vagrancy 
in the VCP is having ‘no visible means of  subsistence’. Particularly in 
a context where young peoples’ transition to ‘socially acceptable status 
of  adulthood’ (Honwana 2014: 29–31) is severely compromised, a 
dependence on activities in the informal economy is inevitable. Studies 
have indicated that young people with limited opportunities for social 
mobility rely on casual work and activities on the fringe of  legality. These 
survival strategies are not considered ‘visible means of  subsistence’ by the 
IDS Bulletin Vol. 48 No. 3 May 2017: ‘Africa’s Youth Employment Challenge: New Perspectives’ 33–50 | 41
Institute of Development Studies | bulletin.ids.ac.uk
VCP, which makes young people who are actively involved in the street 
economy (Di Nunzio 2012) prime targets of  the proclamation.
Di Nunzio (2012) describes survival strategies of  young people in poor 
urban neighbourhoods in Addis Ababa as including a combination 
of  street activities, which are broadly defined as hustling. Hustling is 
‘being smart and finding a way to make money for survival’ (ibid: 443). 
Common street activities include brokering small transactions, running 
errands for a small fee, working as an informal tourist guide and 
grabbing any opportunity that would generate money. Sometimes 
hustling may involve illegal activities such as pick-pocketing, thieving 
and drug selling. It is important to note that hustling differs significantly 
from the notion of  being ‘idle’ and ‘unemployed’. Young people who 
are involved in hustling consider that their activities are ‘tiring’, and 
require skills, networking and different layers of  interactions.
The VCP’s focus on these young people became more pronounced 
during the highly contested 2005 elections. The government used the 
VCP as an instrument of  repression when it targeted unemployed 
youth because of  their support for the opposition during the tense 
pre- and post-election period. Opposition parties widely criticised the 
government for the high unemployment rate and for its criminalising 
discourse. The government labelled young people who participated 
en masse in pre-election demonstrations and post-election protests as 
‘dangerous vagrants’, ‘jobless’ and ‘unruly’ young people (Aalen and 
Tronvoll 2009; Di Nunzio 2012). Furthermore, unemployed youth and 
particularly those surviving through hustling constituted a significant 
majority of  the nearly 30,000 people detained during the post-election 
violence (Gebremariam and Herrera 2016). Hence, in the tense political 
context around the election, unemployment was not only associated 
with crime but also dissent and protest.
The VCP definition of  vagrancy also unequivocally focuses on the 
individual – an ‘able-bodied’ person not having any ‘visible means 
of  subsistence’. The proclamation never mentions a single causal or 
contributing factor – social, economic, cultural or political. Thus it 
fails to recognise the multiple factors that can force young people into 
activities defined as vagrancy, including an ineffective education system, 
lack of  work, and the expectations of  society that young people quickly 
become independent adults (Miles 2003: 189). As discussed earlier, a 
political context which removes systems of  direct and indirect support 
for youth employment pushes young people to the margins of  illegal 
activities. When opportunities for transition into adulthood become 
narrow, young people engage in activities such as hustling. By focusing 
on the survival strategies of  these economically marginalised young 
people, the VCP missed the root cause of  the problem.
To conclude, the VCP came into being when the political context and 
limited economic opportunities had led a large number of  unemployed 
youth to hustle for survival through a combination of  legal and illegal 
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activities. Both societal narratives and the VCP perceived the survival 
strategies of  the youth and the situation they were forced into as 
deviance; hence a threat that needed legal intervention (Mains 2012). 
However, the VCP was not the only approach that the EPRDF used to 
address youth issues. It also produced a youth policy that is discussed in 
the following section.
4.2 National Youth Policy
Endorsed on 12 March 2004, the National Youth Policy (NYP) is one 
of  Ethiopia’s most significant youth-specific state documents. It argues 
that an age-based definition of  youth is ‘most suitable for research and 
policy purposes’ (MYSC 2004: 3), and goes on to define youth as people 
between 15 and 29 years. The NYP envisions ‘creating [an] empowered 
young generation’ (op. cit.: 19) with values incorporating a democratic 
outlook, knowledge, professional skills, organised engagement and ethical 
integrity. The objectives of  the policy include: to ‘bring about active 
participation of  youth’ (ibid.) in socioeconomic, political and cultural 
activities; and ‘enable [youth] to fairly benefit from the results’ (ibid.).
The VCP and NYP emerged at approximately the same time and 
within the same socioeconomic and political context. However, the 
NYP was produced based on a ‘comprehensive study’ (op. cit.: 1) which 
involved consultation with stakeholders including youth. The study 
conducted as a baseline for the policy identify pervasiveness of  extreme 
poverty (44 per cent in 2004), high youth unemployment (67 per cent in 
1999), high prevalence of  HIV/AIDS and low enrolment in secondary 
and higher education as major challenges for Ethiopian youth. 
Furthermore, the country’s long history of  non-democratic politics is 
highlighted as a hindrance to meaningful youth participation.
There are two levels of  narrative within the NYP: a broad narrative 
about the status of  youth, and a narrative more specific to youth 
employment. At the broader level, high levels of  poverty, economic 
and political marginalisation are identified as main factors restricting 
young people’s ‘potential energies and capabilities’ (op. cit.: 5). The 
policy envisions changing the dire socioeconomic and political situation 
through ‘active participation’ (op. cit.: 19) of  the youth. The government 
aims to play an instrumental role to help youth organise themselves and 
actively participate in ‘development endeavours, building democratic 
system and good governance’ (op. cit.: 21).
The narrative specific to youth employment issues has multiple layers. 
The NYP suggests that the government alone cannot ‘resolve the 
problem of  unemployment’ (op. cit.: 12). Hence, the policy aims to create 
favourable conditions for the youth to ‘create new jobs for themselves’ 
(op. cit.: 26), and to enable the private sector to create job opportunities 
for them. It also advocates for policy interventions that shape both 
formal and informal employment opportunities, and suggests that these 
can help address the under- and unemployment problems among youth. 
With regard to rural youth, ensuring access to land and expansion 
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of  off-farm activities are identified as part of  the solution to youth 
unemployment.
One of  the most important framings adopted by the NYP is an 
age-based definition of  youth. While it is not the only document to 
use age-based definitions, taking an age-based definition has serious 
limitations. One of  these is the tendency for homogenisation, despite 
important differences arising from gender, culture, socioeconomic 
status and geographic location. For example, the kinds of  expectations, 
experiences, challenges and opportunities facing young men and women 
vary significantly despite age similarities. Mains (2012) for instance 
talks of  ‘barriers to adulthood’ for young men in Jimma town because 
of  limited economic opportunities to move towards marriage and 
fatherhood. In this case, young men are forced into a prolonged period 
of  transitioning into adulthood. On the contrary, young women might 
be forced by cultural practices of  early marriage, even as young as ten, 
which inevitably shortens their period of  transition. It is also important 
to note the salient role that socioeconomic status and geographic location 
play in shaping young peoples’ lives, despite belonging to the same age 
cohort. For example, young people from wealthy families may have better 
access to opportunities than other young people in the same age cohort. 
Likewise, social norms, values and practices based on age hierarchies 
among different cultural groups across the country also vary considerably. 
Hence, the age-based definition needs to be used with caution.
The other main characterisation of  youth in the NYP is in terms of  their 
receptiveness to ‘new ideas’, [their] ‘potential capacity for creativity and 
productivity’, and ‘potential energies and capabilities’. This framing is 
supported by depictions of  youth as ‘nation builders’ and positive ‘agents 
of  change’. While focusing on the potential capabilities of  young people, 
the NYP also identifies present-day challenges that may compromise 
the future – for example, young people as potential victims of  an 
unfavourable environment broadly categorised as ‘economic and social 
problems’. Here youth are portrayed as marginalised and vulnerable 
members of  society who are ‘exposed to social evils’ (MYSC 2004: 5).
In response to the crisis around the 2005 election, the government relied 
on the VCP instead of  the NYP. As argued earlier, unemployed young 
people in the informal economy were targeted because of  their direct 
involvement in the post-election violence. Furthermore, the highly 
technocratic approach of  the NYP, with its stakeholder engagement 
and strategic plan, was not deemed to be useful in the short term. The 
EPRDF-led government faced a serious crisis of  political legitimacy 
because of  the post-election violence. It chose to address this among 
the youth through massive political mobilisation: the political priority 
was addressing the legitimacy deficit, irrespective of  the existing youth 
policy framework.
In general, it can be argued that the NYP illustrated the case in which the 
political context becomes a vital factor in shaping policy processes. When 
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the NYP was formulated, the government was not under any immediate 
political pressure. However, when the political environment became tense, 
the NYP was not used to guide the political processes of  cooperation 
and negotiation with the youth that the government badly needed. The 
political urgency required another policy framework, and as a result the 
government drafted and introduced the Youth Development Package 
(YDP) that directly serves the political interest of  the government. The 
following section further elaborates on the YDP.
4.3 Youth Development Package
The Youth Development Package (YDP) was launched in September 
2006. The associated documentation claims that the YDP reflects 
consultations with youth in both urban and rural areas (FDRE 2006: 6). 
Based on the consultations, the YDP was formulated to address three 
‘burning problems’: unemployment, ‘unavailability of  well-equipped 
and youth-focused social services and recreational centres’ and 
‘exclusion and lack of  participation forums’. A number of  ‘strategic 
directions’ are set out through which these issues will be addressed. 
Perhaps the key one is the endorsement of  youth as the ‘front-leaders’ 
to solve the problems they are facing. Additional strategic directions 
include: ‘enabling the youth to understand its leading role’, ‘facilitating 
[the creation of] youth participation forums’, ‘enhancing young people’s 
educational, vocational and leadership skills for improved participation’, 
and ‘organizing the youth depending on their interests’. The package 
assigns the role of  ‘key supporter’ to the state in addressing the ‘burning 
problems’. The YDP adopts the age-based definition of  youth set by the 
NYP and approaches the problems of  urban, rural and pastoralist youth 
differently (ibid.: 1–19).
The YDP emerged as a response to the 2005 post-election violence: 
in effect, the government used the YDP to try to mend its relations 
with young people. The central narrative of  the YDP focuses on the 
imminent risk associated with youth marginalisation. This narrative 
establishes a direct connection between the status of  youth and both 
the existing and future socioeconomic and political orders. The central 
proposition – that the level of  exclusion and desperation among youth 
has detrimental effects in the present and the future – suggests the YDP 
is mainly meant to mitigate ‘serious risk’. Within this narrative, the 
YDP addresses youth as vital actors: in the present as nation builders, 
and in the future as ‘inheritors’ or ‘successors’. Youth need to prepare 
themselves to be ‘leaders of  their time’, while the government must play 
its role ‘to prepare’ the youth to become ‘inheritors’ (ibid.: 2).
Unemployment is identified as one of  the burning problems that 
requires a coordinated response, and it is argued that the causes of  
youth unemployment in urban and rural areas have both similarities 
and differences. Some common causes are identified such as limited 
skills development and exclusion of  those who are not in education, 
employment or training. It is also suggested that limited access to 
financial services restricts youth entrepreneurship. Two factors are 
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posited to contribute specifically to urban youth unemployment, with 
the first being the constraining environment that inhibits the private 
sector and specifically growth of  micro and small enterprises (MSEs). 
The second factor is that the education system needs ‘to produce 
entrepreneurial youth with improved skills and mind-set’. The YDP 
argues that unemployment among rural youth is deeply rooted in the 
land tenure system, which excludes them and makes them ‘property-
less’. The document notes that the national agricultural policy neglects 
the specific challenges of  rural youth, which contributes to their ‘high 
economic vulnerability’. In order to address these problems, the 
YDP aims to expand off-farm employment and income-generating 
opportunities (ibid.: 5–8).
Two observations can be made about the YDP. First, it can be seen as 
an example of  a policy process that responded quickly to a particular 
political crisis. Political expedience – the Prime Minister’s Office 
formulated the YDP and ordered the Ministry of  Youth, Sports and 
Culture (MYSC) to implement it – meant that the finer points of  
policy formulation, like consultation, went out of  the window. Broadly 
speaking, the YDP is fairly similar in its narratives and framings to the 
NYP. But it also has unique features: for example, despite adopting 
the age-based definition of  youth, the YDP attempts to broadly 
categorise youth in terms of  their geographical location and primary 
socioeconomic activities. In doing so, the YDP categorised youth as 
being either urban, rural or pastoral. Challenges and opportunities 
that correspond to these categories were also elaborated. Perhaps the 
long-standing EPRDF tradition of  producing detailed political strategy 
documents came into play in the production of  the YDP. Whilst 
the NYP followed the formal structure and presentation of  a policy 
document, the YDP is produced in a detailed 90-page document similar 
to other political strategy and propaganda documents.
Second, while relying fairly on similar framings and narratives to 
the NYP, the YDP clearly acknowledged structural and institutional 
constraints on youth. The government did not stop at identifying 
the constraints; it also acted swiftly to address both economic and 
political marginalisation. For example, it highlighted the expansion 
of  MSEs, and provided young people with financial and technical 
assistance to start their own businesses. Obviously, since the programme 
was primarily initiated to regain the government’s legitimacy, the 
sustainability and long-term impact must be carefully examined. 
However, the effort required to address youth unemployment with 
actual job creation programmes should be recognised. As part of  the 
effort to address the political marginalisation of  young people, the 
EPRDF also initiated Youth Forums, particularly in Addis Ababa, as a 
permanent consultation platform between youth and the government.
4.4 National development plans
Three national development plans have been adopted since 2005, and 
in different ways each addressed youth issues and particularly youth 
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employment. The Plan for Accelerated and Sustainable Development 
to End Poverty (PASDEP) (2005–10) (MoFED 2006) emerged as part of  
the global effort to reduce poverty which had the effect of  reducing any 
sense of  ownership on the part of  the Ethiopian government. With the 
subsequent Growth and Transformation Plans (GTP I from 2010–15, 
and GTP II from 2015–20), the government enjoyed more policy space 
to formulate its own approach and plans. After electoral defeat in several 
constituencies, the EPRDF engaged in mass mobilisation, effective political 
restrictions and huge public sector investment (Aalen and Tronvoll 2009; 
Gudina 2011). These activities contributed to the party winning 99.6 per 
cent of  the parliament seats during the 2010 elections. The national 
development plans need to be examined in relation to the political context 
from which they emerge. Accordingly, in GTP I, the government officially 
declared its aim to build a ‘democratic developmental state’ (MoFED 
2010: 22), and this was reaffirmed in GTP II. Both plans were preceded 
by national elections that gave the ruling party control of  almost all 
parliamentary seats. Hence, the development plans were also commitments 
through which the ruling elite sought to consolidate its legitimacy.
PASDEP addressed youth employment by incorporating the narratives 
of  NYP and the ten-year multi-sector and five-year strategic plans that 
followed the NYP. By aligning PASDEP and NYP, the government 
attempted to maintain some level of  policy coherence. However, as 
noted earlier, once the YDP entered the policy scene, it replaced all other 
youth-specific policy frameworks. GTP I approached youth issues in 
tandem with sports, and youth-specific objectives were presented in broad 
terms: ‘[T]o increase the participation of  youth in democratic governance 
and economic development processes’ (ibid.: 112). The three identified 
‘GTP I targets for youth development’ were increasing youth centres at 
district level; youth mainstreaming in development programmes; and 
increasing the number of  youth volunteers. No clear indication was given 
as to how youth employment would be addressed. GTP II maintained 
the broad objective of  enhancing meaningful youth participation in 
the socioeconomic and political arenas. GTP II defines youth as ‘seeds 
of  development and democracy’ and aims to make them sources of  
‘developmental investors’ through entrepreneurship schemes (MoFED 
2015: 86) It further argues that youth employment is best addressed 
by organising young people in MSEs. The plan aims to integrate the 
job creation and entrepreneurship programmes with education and 
training and the manufacturing sector (ibid: 127). To this end, it set a 
goal of  organising 7.43 million young people in MSEs and 1.35 million 
in cooperative unions. These plans included making approximately 
£366 million available to young entrepreneurs.
In all three documents, the age-based definition of  the NYP was 
the main departure point. Youth issues are also presented as ‘cross-
cutting’ in the national development plans. At the same time, there is a 
shared portrayal of  youth as a marginalised and excluded segment of  
society that needs coordinated support. GTP II in particular uses the 
phrase ‘seeds of  democracy and development’ (ibid.: 86) to embed the 
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process of  growing up into the political and economic discourse of  the 
developmental state.
5 Discussions and conclusions
Three main learning points can be identified. The first is that context 
plays a critical role in influencing when a policy emerges, how it is 
formulated and implemented, and who gets involved. The VCP, NYP, 
YDP and the national development plans emerged in different contexts 
and these contexts are reflected in their respective narratives, framings 
and implementation. The structural adjustment period that caused 
the economic marginalisation of  youth did not trigger a direct policy 
response. Rather, the resulting prolonged period of  unemployment and 
transition was treated as a sign of  deviance and a threat to society, and 
the VCP was crafted as a remedy. The NYP, while in many ways good 
intentioned, had minimum impact, and was quickly overtaken by the 
YDP and GTPs after the 2005 election crisis. The post-election crisis 
provided the EPRDF with lessons about the relevance of  cooperation and 
negotiation, and as a result new framings were introduced that recognised 
the marginalisation of  youth and the need for them to be included.
The second point is about how policies in turn affect the way politics 
is pursued. For example, the VCP with its narrow perspective arguably 
contributed to the 2005 conflict. On the other hand, policies with a 
different point of  departure, which are not focused on criminalising 
youth – such as the creation of  Youth Forums and promotion of  MSEs 
– can promote political processes based on cooperation and negotiation.
The third point is that policies rooted in long-term developmental 
objectives and the political vision of  the state tend to be consistent 
in their narratives and framings, and can be effective in identifying 
root causes and delivering tangible outcomes. As a result of  its strong 
developmentalist orientation, the Ethiopian state can claim to have 
created millions of  jobs and self-employment opportunities for youth.
In terms of  addressing youth employment, two points need to be 
underlined. First, the challenges of  youth employment cannot be 
addressed with categorical approaches to defining youth or with 
approaches that frame young people as isolated individuals. The VCP’s 
criminalising narrative stems from detaching the individual young person 
from the socioeconomic and political context in which they live. Second, 
when broader socioeconomic and political contexts are taken into 
account, challenges of  youth employment can be addressed systematically. 
The NYP, YDP and GTP II identified structural and institutional 
challenges, which set the stage for effective long-term intervention.
Finally, the analysis demonstrates that it is important to examine youth 
employment within the context of  the broader socioeconomic and political 
dynamics of  the state. How state elites pursue their political purposes 
determines the developmental orientation of  the state. These broader 
political dynamics inevitably shape youth employment policy processes.
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